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THE MAD /BAD / GOD TRILEMMA: 
A REPLY TO DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 
Stephen T. Davis 
The present paper is a response to Daniel Howard-Snyder's essay, "Was 
Jesus Mad, Bad, or God? .. Or Merely Mistaken?" I reply to two of 
Howard-Snyder's arguments, one based on the notion of "dwindling 
probabilities" and the other based on the stories he tells to rationalize the 
possibility that Jesus was "merely mistaken." Since neither argument 
accomplishes its purpose, I conclude that Howard-Snyder has failed to 
refute the Mad/Bad/God argument in favor of the incarnation. 
I 
Many Christians are familiar with a popular apologetic argument in 
favor of the divinity of Christ called lithe Trilemma" or lithe 
Mad/Bad/God argument." (I will call it the MBG argument.) It has been 
defended most famously by C.S. Lewis/ but also by other Christian apolo-
gists since Lewis. I have recently argued that the MBG argument can be 
used to establish the rationality of belief in the incarnation of Jesus.2 
But now Professor Daniel Howard-Snyder has subjected the MBG argu-
ment to a rigorous critique.3 He summarizes the argument as follows: 
1. Jesus claimed, explicitly or implicitly, to be divine. 
2. Either Jesus was right or he was wrong. 
3. If he was wrong, then either 
or 
a. he believed he was wrong and he was lying, or 
b. he did not believe he was wrong and he was institutionalizable, 
c. he did not believe he was wrong and he was not institutionaliz-
able; rather, he was merely mistaken. 
4. He was not lying, i.e., a is false. 
5. He was not institutionalizable, i.e., b is false 
6. He was not merely mistaken, i.e., c is false. 
7. So, he was right, i.e., Jesus was, and presumably still is, divine. 
Interestingly, Howard-Snyder is prepared to grant the truth of premise (1), 
which many people would consider the most controversial premise of the 
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argument, as well as the truth of (4), and (5). It is premise (6) that he ques-
tions. That is, Howard-Snyder denies that the MBG arguer can sensibly 
rule out the possibility that Jesus was "merely mistaken" in believing him-
self to be divine. 
II 
Let us then consider the case that Howard-Snyder makes. I will focus on 
just two of his arguments: (1) his use of the "dwindling probabilities" argu-
ment (the DPA); and (2) the stories he uses to rationalize the possibility that 
Jesus was neither mad nor bad but merely mistaken in claiming to be divine. 
The DP A is a strategy that Howard-Snyder borrows from Alvin 
Plantinga. In his Warranted Christian Belief," Plantinga argues that a faithful 
acceptance of the Christian gospel must be a gift of God. It is not some-
thing that human beings can, so to speak, recognize and accept quite on 
their own. Nor can a convincing natural theological argument show that 
the Christian gospel is true or even probably true. It involves crucial and 
controversial claims about (among other things) God, revelation, sin, incar-
nation, resurrection, atonement, and the church. So any rational argument 
in favor of the claim that the Christian gospel is probable is going to face 
this damaging fact---even if you show that one crucial point in it has a cer-
tain fairly high degree of probability, that probability will be reduced when 
you try to argue for the high probability of the next crucial point, and the 
one after that, and etc. Each time a new point is added, the relevant proba-
bilities have to be multiplied. So there is no way that the entire package 
will end up with anything like a high degree of probability. 
Let me make two main points in response to Howard-Snyder's use of 
the DP A. The first has to do with the form and application of the argu-
ment. The second has to do with the actual probability numbers that he 
supplies to the premises of the MBG argument. 
(1) The form and application of the DPA. I should point out first that 
Howard-Snyder apparently is not deeply committed to the DP A. I read 
him as saying that if the proper way to assess the MBG argument is in 
terms of the probability calculus, then the DP A can be raised against it. In 
other words, Howard-Snyder is not asserting that this is indeed the proper 
way to evaluate the MBG argument, but he suspects that many people will 
hold that it is. Still, just in case those people are correct, I need to reply to 
Howard-Snyder's (so to speak) hypothetical use of the argument. 
The DPA is relevant to any inductive argument that amounts to a chain 
of probabilistic inferences. Suppose we are trying to argue on behalf of a 
hypothesis H. And suppose we argue as follows: "P, therefore very proba-
bly Q; Q, therefore very probably R; R, therefore very probably S; and S, 
therefore very probably H." In such a case, the dwindling probabilities 
objection can ruin the argument. This is because the probability numbers 
(once actual values are supplied) have to be multiplied at each step, and 
accordingly may well result in H having a value of less than 0.5. 
Plantinga's argument works against a certain way of doing natural theol-
ogy. For example, a natural theologian might first try to argue on the basis of 
our background knowledge that it is probable that God exists, and then try to 
argue on the basis of our background knowledge plus the probability of the 
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claim that God exists that it is probable that God reveals things to human beings, 
and then try to argue on the basis of our background knowledge plus the 
probability of the claim that God exists plus the probability of the claim that 
God reveals things to human beings that it is probable that human beings are 
sinners, etc. At each new point, the probabilities will dirrtinish. 
Now there is some reason to think that Howard-Snyder holds that the 
MBG argument takes this form. On this interpretation, the MBG arguer 
must first show that the probability of premise (I), on our background 
knowledge, is high; and then show, on the basis of our background knowl-
edge and the probability of (I), that the probability of (4) is high; and then 
show, on the basis of our background knowledge and the probability of (1) 
and the probability of (4), that the probability of (5) is high; and finally 
show, on the basis of our background knowledge and the probability of (1) 
and the probability of (4) and the probability of (5), that the probability of 
(6) is high. Now if MBG arguers must present their case in this way, then 
the probabilities that will emerge at the end might well dwindle to the 
point of being unimpressive. 
However, this is not the logic of the MBG argument. What then is that 
logic? Using Howard-Snyder's version of it as a rough outline (but supply-
ing new numbers for the premises), it is more like this: 
8. It is highly probable that (1) is true. 
9. Now if (1) is true, Jesus' claim was either true or false. 
10. If it was false, then either he was mad, bad, or merely mistaken. 
lOa. It is highly improbable that he was bad. 
lOb. It is highly improbable that he was mad. 
lac. It is highly improbable that he was merely mistaken. 
11. Accordingly, it is highly improbable that Jesus' claim was false. 
12. Accordingly, it is highly probable that Jesus' claim was true. 
Note that the arguments for anyone of steps (lOa), (lOb), or (lOc) do not 
depend probabilistically on the arguments for the other two. For example, 
the probability of the case that Jesus was not mad does not depend on the 
probability of the case that he was not bad, etc. 
This is the proper strategy of MBG arguers. First they try to show that it is 
highly probable on our background knowledge that Jesus claimed to be 
divine. Then they try to show that it is highly improbable on our back-
ground knowledge that Jesus was lying in claiming to be divine. Then they 
try to show that it is highly improbable on our background knowledge that 
Jesus was mad in claiming to be divine. Finally, they try to show that it is 
highly improbable on our background knowledge that Jesus was "merely 
mistaken" in claiming to be divine. If they can succeed in doing those things, 
then the probability will be high that Jesus was right in claiming to be divine. 
This creates a different logical situation. By the disjunctive axiom of the 
probability calculus, we add, rather than multiply, exclusive alternatives 
like Howard-Snyder's (3a), (3b), and (3c). Accordingly, the probability of 
the disjunction [(3a) v (3b) v (3c)] is the sum of the probabilities of each dis-
junct. (If they overlap-which I do not believe that they do, in this caseS-it 
will be less than that, but still cannot be less than the probability of the most 
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probable disjunct.) So the cogency of the MBG argument will in the end 
depend on just how improbable the disjuncts are. And I hold that they are 
highly improbable, somewhere (I would estimate) around 0.1 each. If I am 
right about that, and if the probability (on our background knowledge) that 
Jesus claimed to be divine is about 0.9, then the probability of [-(3a) & -(3b) 
& -(3c)], which is the proposition that the MBG arguer needs, is somewhere 
near 0.7, and the probability of (7) somewhere near .63. 
In other words, there is a difference between these two probabilistic 
ways of arguing for a hypothesis H. Method A: Very probably P; P, therefore 
very probably Q; Q, therefore very probably R; R, therefore very probably H. 
Method B: Either P or Q or R or H; P is very probably false; R is very probably 
false; Q is very probably false; therefore H is very probably true. I say that the 
DPA applies only to arguments like Method A, not to arguments like 
method B.6 And Howard-Snyder seems to me to hold that the MGB argu-
ment must use something like Method A in establishing the probability of 
[-(3a) & -(3b) & -(3c)]. (See his formal statement of the probabilities on 
page 6 of his paper, where the previously arrived at value for "not lying" 
has to be multiplied in order to get the right value for "not institutionaliz-
able," and both have to be multiplied in order to get the right value for 
"not merely mistaken.") 
I say, on the other hand, that the MBG argument is best understood as 
using something like Method B in establishing the probability of [-(3a) 
& -(3b) & -(3c)]. It is quite true that the MBG arguer needs a high prob-
ability for that conjunction. But I do not think the probability that we 
assign to any of the three conjuncts need have anything to do with the 
probabilities that we assign to the others. There is no need in this case to 
multiply probabilities. 
Let me make the point in a slightly more formal way.7 If k is our back-
ground knowledge, let: 
d = Jesus was divine 
jd = Jesus claimed to be divine 
b = Jesus was bad 
ma = Jesus was mad 
mi = Jesus was mistaken 
Now given that P(d/k) = p(jd & -b & -ma & -milk), Howard-Snyder 
claims that P(d/k) = P(jd/k) P(-b/jd & k) P(-ma/jd & k & -b) P(-mi/jd & 
k & -b & -ma). But I deny that this is the correct way to read the MBG 
argument. In effect, I am using the following formula: P(d/k) = P(jd/k) 
P(-[b v ma v mi]/k & jd). Now suppose we read (3a), (3b), and (3c) of 
Howard-Snyder's summary of the MBG argument as follows: 
(3a) jd & -d & b 
(3b) jd & -d & ma 
(3c) jd & -d & mi. 
Now since b, ma, and mi are exclusive (as noted, we can provide suitable 
definitions of the terms "mad," "bad," and "mistaken" which ensure that), 
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and given my assumption that each of (3a), (3b), and (3c) has a probability 
of about 0.1, then the value of P(3a v 3b v 3c/k) will equal about 0.3. 
Accordingly, POd & ~d & b/k) + P(jd & ~d & ma/k) + P(jd & ~d & milk) 
= 0.3 = P(jd & ~d/k). Now both Howard-Snyder and I assume that the 
POd/k) is high, let's say 0.9. Thus POd/k) = P(jd & d/k) + P(jd & ~d/k). So 
POd & d/k) = about 0.6. Accordingly, P(d/k) = about 0.6.8 
I am not arguing that the dwindling probabilities objection is wholly 
irrelevant to the MBG argument. This is because undeniably there are four 
different probabilities at work in the argument, viz., the probabilities of (1), 
(4), (5), and (6). So Howard-Snyder is not off-base in raising the objection. 
Again, the MBG argument in essence says: 
Jesus probably claimed to be divine. But if he was wrong, then either 
(3a), (3b), or (3c) must be true. Now (3a) is highly improbable; (3b) is 
highly improbable; and (3c) is highly improbable. Therefore, proba-
bly, he was right. 
So in the end you do have to multiply two probabilities, viz. the probability 
that (1) is true and the probability that [(3a) v (3b) v (3c)] is false. 
But if the probabilities of these two sub-points are both high enough, 
then the probability of the conclusion will still be impressive." And this is 
just what I claim. Belief in (7) is rational because its probability is consider-
ably greater than .5. In the light of the MBG argument, it is more probable 
than not (I actually believe it is much more probable than not) that Jesus 
was correct in claiming to be divine. 
(2) Probability numbers. It will not go without notice that Howard-Snyder 
and I have supplied slightly different numbers for the probabilities of some 
of the propositions in question. As noted, I am inclined to assign a proba-
bility of about .9 to (1) and to each of -(3a), -(3b), and ~(3c). Howard-
Snyder gives a range of .7 - .9 for (I), and a range of .85 - .95 for -(3a), -(3b), 
and ~(3c). I do not wish to argue about that point; obviously, these are all 
estimates, and sensible people can sensibly disagree about such matters. 
But there are two points where I do wish to differ. First, suppose that 
the probability that Howard-Snyder assigns to (7)-that is, between .43 
and .77-is correct (and I do not agree that it is). Even if so (or so I would 
argue), that range is high enough that it can be rational to affirm (7), i.e., to 
believe in Christ's divinity. Notice that the mid-point between .43 and .77 is 
.6, and I see no compelling reason to insist that we must suspend judgment 
on propositions that are this probable. Certainly we may suspend judgment 
in such cases; that certainly would be allowed, depending perhaps on 
other circumstances.lO But it does not seem sensible to hold that we must do 
so. And of course that it is rational to believe (7) in the light of the MBG 
argument is all that I have been arguing for. 
This leads directly to the second is sueY I disagree with Howard-
Snyder's claim that we can never justifiably believe that the final probabili-
ty of a proposition is higher than the lowest estimate in the range of proba-
bilities assigned to it. That is, he argues that since we cannot justifiably be 
confident that the probability of (7) is greater than is arrived at when we 
work from the lowest estimate of each of the separate probabilities that pre-
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cede it in the argument (which he computes as .43), "we should profess 
ignorance and suspend judgment." This epistemic principle of Howard-
Snyder's hlrns a slight difference in original probability estimate between 
the two of us (.9 versus .85-.95) into a truly significant difference in the end. 
But surely this is misleading. The probability that we assign to a propo-
sition represents our degree of uncertainty of the proposition's truth. When 
instead of assigning a specific number we assign a range, we are in effect 
assigning a probability to our uncertainty about how uncertain we are about 
the probabilities in question. There are, then, two uncertainties in the 
neighborhood: (1) uncertainty about the truth of a proposition itself, and 
(2) uncertainty about our assigned probability of that truth (which we 
express by giving a range of numbers). But it is important to note that the 
second uncertainty-uncertainty about how certain we really are-is quite 
independent of the first uncertainty. If I am uncertain about whether the 
probability that I assign to p is, say, .55 or .66, this type-(2) uncertainty nei-
ther raises nor lowers the probability of p itself. Howard-Snyder seems to 
assume in effect that this type-(2) uncertainty lowers our type-(l) uncer-
tainty, and that seems to me to be mistaken. 
III 
Let us go on to the second main point. Obviously, since Howard-Snyder 
holds that the MBG argument fails at premise (6), it is incumbent upon him 
to render plausible the supposition that Jesus could have been (neither 
mad nor bad but) "merely mistaken" in claiming to be divine. He tells two 
stories to try to rationalize that possibility. But before turning to them, we 
must consider some preliminary points. 
Howard-Snyder argues against this claim: if Jesus was mistaken, then he 
had a false belief, and if he had a false belief, then he was deluded, and if he was 
deluded, then he was mentally ill or a lunatic. Howard-Snyder correctly points 
out that the conclusion does not follow from what precedes it; it is perfect-
ly possible to be deluded in the sense of having a persistent false belief 
without being insane. 
But sensible MBG arguers would never urge that just any persistent 
false belief held by someone would render that person mentally ill. 
Possibly we are all deluded in that sense at some points. MBG arguers are 
concerned only with cases where somebody is deluded in believing himself 
to be God. Now I suspect that Howard-Snyder is prepared to grant that you 
or I could not be "merely mistaken" if we were to claim to be divine. If we 
did so, we would have to be considered "bad" or "mad." I believe he holds 
this opinion because everybody knows that you and I have displayed on 
numerous occasions features that are incompatible with divinity. But 
Jesus-so I suspect he holds-was unlike us in this regards. 
But notice that Jesus did indeed display on numerous occasions features 
that would quite sensibly have been taken by his contemporaries as being 
incompatible with divinity. Unlike God (Psalm 90:1-4), he was born, for 
example (Matthew 1:18). Unlike God (John 4:24), he had a human body 
(John 20:27). Unlike God (Psalm 139), he was not omnipresent (Mark 1:12-
13). Unlike God (Matthew 19:26), he was not all-powerful (Matthew 26:53). 
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Unlike God (I John 3:20), he was not all-knowing (Mark 13:32). 
What exactly is it to be "merely mistaken" about something? What crite-
ria must be satisfied before someone can be considered "merely mistaken" 
in believing a false proposition p? I would suggest that there are four such 
criteria. It seems that in order to be "merely mistaken" in believing a false 
proposition p, a person A must: 
• believe p; 
• not be insane; 
• not be lying; and 
• be in an epistemic and psychological state where it is possible 
for A, while in that state, to be shown that p is false; for A sin-
cerely to say something like, "I guess I was wrong" or "I stand 
corrected"; and for A to give up belief in p. 
Now if this analysis is even approximately correct, it seems that there 
are plenty of false propositions about which we can easily see how some-
one might be "merely mistaken" in believing them: 
• Caesar's crucial decision was to cross the river Arno. 
• p = 2.14159. 
• Abraham Lincoln was the eighteenth president of the United 
States. 
That is, it is easy to see how someone, through ignorance or confusion or 
forgetfulness, might be "merely mistaken" in believing these false claims. It 
is equally easy to imagine someone who mistakenly believes one of these 
claims being corrected and then saying, "Oops, 1 was wrong." 
There are other false claims where it is much more difficult for us to 
imagine that A could be "merely mistaken" in believing them but where, if 
we try hard enough, we can such imagine scenarios: 
• This year is 1950. 
• I am now in Thailand. 
• My name is Ebeneezer. 
• My mother hates me. 
In order to make sense of somebody being "merely mistaken" about false 
beliefs like this, you would have to tell a pretty convincing story. And 
questions about the probable truth of the story could well be raised. These 
are simply not the sorts of things about which people are normally "merely 
mistaken." But with these beliefs, we can at least imagine scenarios in 
which all four of our criteria for being "merely mistaken" are satisfied. 
But notice how hard it would be to come up with such a scenario for 
someone who is not Napoleon Bonaparte and mistakenly believes: 
• I am Napoleon Bonaparte. 
Can we realistically imagine someone who has this belief being presented 
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with evidence for its falsity and then sincerely saying: "Gosh, I guess I was 
wrong, I'm not Napoleon after all"? And if the answer to this question is 
no, imagine a fortiori the case of somebody who mistakenly believes: 
• I am God. 
Here we see, prior to considering the scenarios that Howard-Snyder actu-
ally suggests, why I hold that that premise (6) of the MBG argument is 
highly probable. 
IV 
So then how does Howard-Snyder try to argue that Jesus might have 
been "merely mistaken" in believing himself to be divine? His main point 
is that Jesus might well have been mistaken about being divine despite hav-
ing sufficient reason to consider himself divine. That is why Jesus might have 
been "merely mistaken" rather than bad or mad. 
Now I am not prepared to allow that anybody other than God ever has 
sufficient reason to consider himself divine. But Howard-Snyder argues as 
follows: 
Kreeft and Tacelli suggest that a merely human Jesus could not have 
believed himself divine since he was a Jew and 'No Jew could sin-
cerely think he was God.' What should we make of this familiar idea? 
Would Jesus' first century orthodox Jewish theology have precluded 
his thinking that he was divine-if in fact he was not divine? Perhaps 
it would have, but, if so, I do not see why. Suppose he was who he 
claimed to be; suppose he was divine, as I believe he was (and is). In 
that case, he had sufficient reason to think he was divine. Whatever 
that reason was, why couldn't it, or something similar to it in epis-
temically relevant respects, be duplicated for one who was not 
divine? I don't see why it could not. But if it were duplicable, then a 
first-century orthodox Jew--even one as sagacious as I believe Jesus 
was-could mistakenly think he was divine.12 
Is this a convincing argument? 
I do not think so. Consider this argument: "Napoleon had sufficient rea-
son to consider himself Emperor of France; ergo, T could have sufficient 
reason to consider myself Emperor or France." Unless we are doing some 
tricky things with the word "could" (e.g., using it as a way of talking about 
mere imaginability or perhaps logical possibility), the argument is hardly 
convincing. Can a person ever have sufficient reason to believe a false-
hood? Of course. But not something (so to speak) this false. 
It has never been my view that it is impossible to cook up scenarios in 
which a sane and moral person could mistakenly consider himself divine.!3 
But even for someone other than Jesus, it seems to me extremely difficult to 
make such a scenario plausible. And when we turn to Jesus-a person 
about whom we know a great deal (surely more than anyone else in the 
ancient world}-it seems to me that the difficulty increases geometrically. 
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It is hard to see how such possibilities could be actual (assuming we are 
using the word "divine" as Christians normally do in this context, viz., as 
indicating a robust identity with the omnipotent, omniscient, and loving 
creator of the world). That is, such scenarios will be very highly improba-
ble. The probability that Jesus was in such a scenario, i.e., was deluded to 
such a degree, will be so low as to be unworthy of serious scholarly consid-
eration. It comes nowhere near squaring with the Jesus about whom we 
read in the New Testament.14 
But let us go on to consider the two scenarios that Howard-Snyder sug-
gests. He does not consider them actual, or even in themselves plausible; 
but he does hold then to be consistent with what we take for granted, and 
not silly. They are, he says, not significantly less plausible than the God 
option, as they would need to be if the MBG argument were to succeed. 
His view is that they accordingly shed significant doubt on premise (6), 
and thus ruin the MBG argument. 
Howard-Snyder tells two stories. The first, which he admits will only be 
of use to those who are open to theism and to the existence of the devil, he 
calls "the Beelzebub Story." Here it is: 
The one and only God ... created angels before He created humans. 
Those angels were created with astounding capacities, and both the 
power to exercise them for the sake of God's glory and their own ful-
fillment as angels, and the power to refrain from exercising them 
toward that end. A great proportion of them refrained; they spumed 
their Creator and led by Satan, the Prince of Darkness, made it their 
goal to ruin God's creatures. That goal remains intact to this day. One 
of the ways in which Satan tries to ruin God's creatures is to deceive 
human beings, to trick them into worshipping not the one, true God, 
but a mere creature. He has discovered that one of the most effective 
ways to do this is to masquerade as an angel of light, as St. Paul 
observed; but the most effective deception involves getting a man to 
masquerade as God himself. Toward that end, Satan duplicates for a 
mere man the good grounds that a man would or might have for 
believing he was divine, if he were divine. He then does his best to 
orchestrate things so that, well, something akin to the events of the 
New Testament unfold. This, in fact, is what happened to Jesus. The 
rest is history. Satan had no idea that things would work out so wel].l5 
There are two points to be made about this story. First, it is surely plau-
sible for Christian theists to suppose that Satan could fool some person into 
believing of himself that he is God. Perhaps that very thing has occurred. 
But what we have to ask is whether it is plausible to suppose that that is 
precisely what happened, not to some abstract human person, but to Jesus. 
To argue convincingly that such a scenario is plausible on the evidence that 
we have seems to me to be an impossibly tall order. 
Second, again, Satan could delude somebody into thinking he was 
divine, but could Satan "duplicate" the goods grounds for that belief had 
by a person who really is divine? I believe the answer to that question is 
clearly and obviously "no." Howard-Snyder raises this very objection to 
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the Beelzebub Story, and argues that " ... if there are strong but fallible 
grounds for supposing that one is divine (something that is in this respect 
like, say, sensory experience), then there is no impediment to Satan dupli-
cating them in a mere man."16 Howard-Snyder has in mind grounds like 
performing miracles and (specifically) raising people from the dead. But 
then we must ask: Can Satan perform miracles? Well, I do not profess to 
know the answer to that question, but perhaps he can. That point can cer-
tainly be debated. But can Satan raise people from the dead? Surely notY 
Howard-Snyder also considers three additions to the Beelzebub Story, 
emendations that he believes strengthen his case. (1) Maybe the devil 
knows "what it is like to be divinity incarnate," and allows some human 
being to share that knowledge and thus believe herself to be God. (2) Or 
maybe God allows Satan to endow some non-divine human being with the 
same sense of "direct, close-up experiential contact with God" that 
Christians believe Jesus had, thus endowing that human being with the 
belief that he is God. (3) Or maybe God does both (1) and (2). 
As for addition (1), we must ask whether the devil can "know what it is 
like to be divinity incarnate," know (as Howard-Snyder puts it) God's "dis-
tinctive way of experiencing the world." And the answer is: surely not. 
Does anyone but God know that? Of course not. It is puzzling to me how 
Howard-Snyder, believer in divine transcendence that he surely is, could 
hold otherwise. Referring to God's complete knowledge of his own 
thoughts, words, and actions (i.e., the thoughts, words, and actions of the 
Psalmist), Psalm 139:6 says: "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is 
so high that I cannot attain it." In other words, even God's knowledge of 
our thoughts and ways is unattainable for human beings, let alone God's 
knowledge of God. 
Moreover, God is love and beauty and truth, and Satan is hate and the 
father of lies. If Satan knew what it is like to be love and beauty and truth, 
surely he would never have fallen. My own view is that love and beauty 
and truth are things that Satan never has understood, not certainly as God 
understands them, and never will. They are alien to him. Envy and pride 
and pain and despair-those are the things Satan understands. 
As for addition (2), we must ask how Satan knows what it is like to have 
the "direct, close-up experiential contact with God" that Christians believe 
Jesus had. And even if somehow Satan does have this kind of knowledge 
(which I deny), Howard-Snyder bears the burden of explaining why God 
would allow such a scenario to be actual, and he offers no such explanation. 
v 
Howard-Snyder's second scenario is called "the Messianic Story." The 
idea is this: Jesus had good reason to believe that he was the messiah, and 
through a careful and innovative study of certain Old Testament texts (pas-
sages like Isaiah 9:6; Psalm 45; Psalm 110:1; and Daniel 7) he came to the con-
clusion that the messiah must be divine, and that accordingly he was divine. 
Thus Howard-Snyder says: "first, Jesus came to believe he himself was 
Messiah ben David. Then, given his reading of the Jewish Scriptures, he 
came to believe that Messiah was divine. He made the natural deduction."l" 
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The "Messiah = God" argument has come up before in discussions of 
the MBG argument, e.g., in John Beversluis' critique of the argumentl4 
(to which I earlier replied).20 Beversluis, responding to C. S. Lewis' ver-
sion of the MBG argument, sought to explain how Jesus could be simply 
mistaken in claiming to be divine. But in mid-argument, he suddenly 
.switched to the question of how Jesus could be simply mistaken in 
claiming to be the messiah. And of course those are two totally different 
questions. Several people in ancient Judaism sincerely but mistakenly 
claimed to be the messiah/1 but I am aware of no such figure who sin-
cerely but mistakenly claimed to be God. Indeed, it seems to me quite 
impossible for any observant first century Jew who was not divine to 
have done so. Jesus is not a counter-example to that strong claim 
because-as Howard-Snyder and I both hold-he was not mistaken in 
claiming to be divine. 
But quite apart from Beversluis, I regard the Messianic Story as 
implausible in the extreme. Suppose I am right that it is not easy to see 
how any sane religious first-century Jew could sincerely but mistakenly 
hold the belief, I am divine.22 Then it is no easier to see how such a person 
could similarly hold the more complex belief, I am the messiah; the messiah 
is divine; therefore, I am divine. No observant Jew, of whatever period, is 
ever going to condone idolatry. The issue is the belief itself, not how one 
arrives at it. And on that point, the Messianic Story is no better than the 
Beelzebub Story. 
Moreover, there is no evidence in the New Testament itself that the 
Messianic Story applies to Jesus. Indeed, the very idea that the Messiah 
was divine would have been shocking to first century Jews. There were, of 
course, multiple views of the Messiah in the air during that time. But the 
belief that the Messiah was divine is a Christian idea-implicitly taught (so 
I believe) by Jesus-not a Jewish one.23 
VI 
I conclude that the "merely mistaken" option is highly improbable. But 
since the "mad" and "bad" options are also highly improbable (as 
Howard-Snyder admits), it follows that the MBG argument still stands. It 
looks to be a successful piece of Christian apologetics. I still hold that it can 
establish the rationality of Christian belief in the divinity of Jesus. 
It is important to note that I have been arguing only for this last relative-
ly modest conclusion. I have not argued that the MBG argument establish-
es the irrationality of unbelief in the divinity of Jesus. My argument is limit-
ed in this way in part because the various probabilities, once multiplied, 
will surely not be so high as to render unbelief in (7) irrational. And one 
reason for that fact-as I have admitted all along-is that it is possible to 
imagine (very highly improbable) scenarios in which Jesus was either bad, 
or mad, or merely mistaken. 
Accordingly, I only claim that the MBG argument can be used to render 
belief in (7) rationaF" 
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4. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford 
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5. If Jesus was merely mistaken, he was hardly mad or bad. If he was 
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not to moral culpability) or merely mistaken. If he was bad, he was hardly 
merely mistaken or mad (although some bad people probably have a degree 
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6. If the applicability of the DP A is not limited in some such way as 
this, it seems to me that it will have rather daunting epistemic implications 
for many of the things that we think we know in science, history, or even 
ordinary life. 
7. I was assisted in making this point by Richard Swinburne. 
8. I recognize that a critic of the MBG argument might claim that the 
probability we assign to (3a), (3b), and (3c) must be affected, i.e., lowered, by 
our granting that Jesus made the highly unusual claim expressed in (1). But I 
do not think the value will be affected significantly. 
9. This is a point that Swinburne himself makes in a brief response to 
Plantinga on pp. 215-216 of his The Resurrection of God Incarnate (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003). 
10. These would be circumstances like: how important the proposition 
is, whether it makes any real difference in one's life, whether there is signifi-
cant risk involved in being mistaken about it, how many people in the com-
munity I am addressing already accept it, how strongly they accept it, etc. 
11. lowe this point to William Hasker. 
12. Howard-Snyder, p. 25. 
13. I said as much in "Was Jesus Mad, Bad, or God?" See pp. 224-225. 
14. I say that because, as everyone knows, there is no end to the bizarre 
hypotheses that are being foisted on the public these days about Jesus. 
15. Howard-Snyder, pp. 29-30. 
16. Howard-Snyder, p. 31. 
17. I doubt very much that Howard-Snyder considers Satan as having 
anything like omnipotence, and I am positive that he does not consider 
Satan omniscient. See the concluding sentence of the Beelzebub Story 
(Howard-Snyder, p. 30). 
18. Howard-Snyder, p. 36. 
19. See John Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1985), pp. 544-557. 
20. "Was Jesus Mad, Bad, or God?," p. 223, fn. 6. One crucial point is that 
there is nothing in Beversluis' argument of Howard-Snyder's OT-plus-ele-
mentary-Iogic argument. 
21. For example, Bar Kokhba, Abu Isa al-Isfahani, Severus, and an 
anonymous Jew from third century Crete. 
22. To answer a question Howard-Snyder raised in his essay, by the sen-
tence, "It is not easy for me to see how p could be true" I just mean some-
thing like, "Based on what I know or firmly believe, p is highly improbable." 
23. The closest thing to a divine messiah in Jewish literature is in I Enoch, 
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where the Messiah seems to have a kind of heavenly co-regency with God. 
But even in this text, there is no thought of the Messiah's actually being God. 
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